The purpose of this work is twofold. First, we extend the concept of repeated game, relaxing the assumption that the game starts in a given period. The second contribution is to propose a concept of dynamic stability in infinitely repeated games with discounting. We show that, for a sufficiently high discount factor, feasible and individually rational outcomes that are not Nash equilibrium of the stage game can be supported as a stable equilibrium in the repeated game. This is some kind of 'folk' result, but for stable equilibria. The proof is also constructive, yielding the strategies that are needed to support the outcome.
Introduction:
The dynamic features of repeated games have been analyzed in a number of studies. If the same players play the same game repeatedly, then they can choose their actions as a function of the history of what have been played. Although the physical environment of a repeated game does not change across time (payoffs and actions are the same each period, regardless of the past actions), this history plays the role of some kind of state variable. This 'dynamic programming' approach has been revealed as a very useful tool. One example of its applications is the work by Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990) .
The first dynamic consequence is that Nash equilibrium is not an appropriate concept to study repeated games (it is not appropriate to study any dynamic game) because some equilibria can be based on non-credible threats.
The very well known solution to this problem is to focus on subgame perfect equlibria.
Another dynamic consequence is that it is not necessary to play a static NE each period. Players can play in one period something different from the static best response in order to induce, through the history, some kind of play in the future. The natural question arises: What kind of actions (different from the static NE) can be supported in a repeated game? The 'folk' theorems provide an answer for SPE 1 . Apart from some technical conditions, all action profiles with an individually rational static payoff can be supported as a SPE of an infinitely repeated game.
This result often rely on the so-called trigger strategies. However, the use of this kind of strategies brings additional problems. For example, if for some mistake the history is slightly perturbed, the continuation path induced by trigger strategies changes dramatically, switching from a path of cooperation to a path of (usually) Nash reversion. Obviously, this cannot satisfy whatever concept of dynamic stability one can have.
My claim goes further. I argue that the concept itself of repeated game is not appropriated for the problem it tries to study. Even if we require strategies to converge to the same path for small mistakes or perturbations in past actions, the equilibrium would not satisfy dynamic stability. Hence, I propose a new concept of repeated game, relaxing the assumption that the game starts in a given period. This will be found both useful and necessary. Then, a concept of dynamic stability is provided for these kind of repeated games. Finally I find that individually rational pure strategy profiles can be supported as the limit of a stable equilibrium. Later in this section I will provide some intuition for these claims, but now let me relate my work with the previous literature in which I have obtained help and ideas. Abreu (1988) argues that we can have a penalty greater than Nash reversion (the penalty usually assumed in trigger strategies). My work relates with this in that I use a penalty greater than Nash reversion. In fact, I need a penalty worse (or equal) than the minmax, but only for a finite number of periods. On the other hand, the penalty in Abreu (1988) is for an infinite number of periods (if there are no deviations in the punishment phase), and it is not worse than the minmax.
In contrast with Abreu (1988) , there are some recent studies concerned with the size of the penalty. Evans and Thomas (2001) use the concept of perturbed game to study repeated games and cooperation. They criticize the previous work by Aumann and Sorin (1989) and Anderlini and Sabourian (1995) , showing that the result "perturbation implies efficiency" can be achieved only if there are 'draconian' penalties in the support of the perturbation, i.e. penalties prepared to minmax a player almost all the time. I have the same concern. Even Nash reversion is a very big penalty to be fully credible. Moreover, if we have endless penalties, we cannot have dynamic stability. In contrast with their work, I don't use perturbed strategies. Players are assumed to be totally rational all the time.
The strategy presented below is related with at least two other strategies proposed in the previous literature. Green and Porter (1984) present a strategy that has, as the one presented here, a finite number of punishment periods. However, since their model is of imperfect information, the punishment phase is defined as a function of one observable variable (the price) that imperfectly reflects the actions of other players. Therefore, even when players do not deviate, the observable variable sometimes induce the punishment phase, in particular when it falls below a trigger level, generating fluctuations in the behavior of players. Hence, this environment is not adequate to study stability issues; the motivation is totally different. A similar strategy can be found in Piccione (2002) .
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) use in their theorem 5.4 a strategy with three phases. One is the cooperative phase. If someone deviates, the game goes to a finite punishment phase. However, in contrast with our strategy, at the end of this second phase the play doesn't return to the cooperative phase. Instead, it goes to a third phase with payoffs between the other two. Therefore, the strategies do not induce a dynamically stable equilibrium. Moreover, as I will argue below, even if the game returns to the cooperative phase, dynamic stability doesn't hold, because we are imposing exogenously that play begins in the cooperative phase.
An analogy is useful to understand the results presented here. Think for a moment in the Solow model. We have a state variable, and solving the equilibrium we obtain a law of motion for this state variable. This law of motion, together with an initial value for the state variable, is enough to characterize the equilibrium path. When we study the stability of this equilibrium, we say that it is stable because for all initial values for the state variable, the equilibrium path converges to the same value. It is not sufficient to check that equilibrium path converges to something for one particular initial condition. We need to check that it converges for all initial values for the state variable.
However, the traditional analysis of repeated games is only capable of analyze the convergence for one value of the state variable. As it was said before, the state variable in a repeated game is the history, or the reputation. But, when we say that the game starts in a given period, we cannot say anything about the initial value of the state variable. Indeed, it is implicitly assumed that play begins with full reputation, because strategies often recommend players to cooperate in the first period. The available theory is silent about how this initial value is generated. Note that it is irrelevant to make an implicit assumption, or to say that we assume explicitly (and exogenously) a certain degree of reputation at the beginning: we are in both cases analyzing the convergence for only one initial value. What we need is a theory capable of determine endogenously initial conditions, and the absence of history in the first period makes it impossible, because we don't have anything endogenous in the first period!. This is exactly what we are doing in this work. We take all possible histories in a given period for a game that has no beginning. This is a generalization of a repeated game with an initial node (or, alternatively, with an exogenous initial reputation). We are studying convergence for all initial values, whereas the traditional analysis focuses only on one initial value. In fact, a repeated game with beginning node is one subgame of the repeated game with no beginning node.
One possible interpretation of cooperation in repeated games with beginning is the following. We have players with a history plenty of defections and deviations, and eventually players accord to forget about the past and cooperate in the future. Obviously, trigger strategies will penalize deviating players to avoid deviations. However this argument is very weak for me, because if it was profitable to make the agreement yesterday, I can deviate and then propose my opponent to forget about the past, make the agreement, etc. Why did he accepted yesterday and he is not willing to accept today? Stable SPE is a much stronger concept than SPE. In a stable SPE, we can say that, no matter how is initial reputation, players will eventually cooperate, whereas in a SPE we can say at best that players will cooperate if the initial reputation is a particular one; we cannot say anything if the initial reputation is different.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the existing theory of repeated games, and propose the main definitions in which the rest of the work is based, including the definition of a stable SPE. Section 3 presents a theorem useful to characterize the outcomes supportable as a stable SPE. Finally, concluding thoughts and possible extensions are presented in section 4. An example is included along the paper to illustrate concepts.
Definitions:
In this section I present the notation to be used. In addition, I extend the concept of a repeated game with an initial period or node, presenting the definition of a repeated game without initial period. Finally, I make a straightforward definition of a stable subgame perfect equilibrium.
Stage Game:
Suppose we have a stage game with two players. For simplicity, assume that the two players make their choices simultaneously, and also that the game is symmetric. Each player has a set of possible actions. This set can be discrete or continuous, finite or infinite. Let's call this set S. The particular choices of the two players will be denoted by s 1 , s 2 ∈ S. Let's define the instantaneous payoff function u as follows:
It is used in this paper the following convention: u(a, b) denote the payoff of one player when this player plays a and the other plays b. In other words, the first argument is always the action of the player receiving the utility.
Assumption A1: The function u is bounded above and below, and the (static) best response correspondence BR i (s j ) = arg max
Example: Consider the Cournot competition model with two firms and no marginal cost. Assume that the demand function is
, which is obviously non-empty valued for s j ∈ S, and u (·) ∈ £ 0, 1 4 ¤ .
Repeated Game:
Now we construct a new game by the infinite iteration of the stage game defined before. It is usually assumed in the literature that the repeated game starts in a given period and continues up to infinity. Later we extend this concept repeating the game from minus infinity up to infinity. To facilitate comparison between the two concepts we present here some definitions about a repeated game with initial node. Let's call the first stage game period 0, the second period 1 and so on. It is useful to define the object 'history' in period t as the actions played by both players in previous periods, and period t itself:
. Denote the set of all possible histories at t by H t .
Now we can define a strategy for player i in this repeated game as follows:
Definition 1 A strategy for player i in the repeated game with initial node is an infinite set of functions, one for each t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} of the form s t i : H t−1 → S, and an action s 0 i ∈ S for period 0.
Note that the set H t = (S × S)
t is different depending on the period t. A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) can be defined in the following way:
Definition 2 A pair of strategies {s
constitute a SPE of the repeated game with initial node if, for all periods t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, and for all histories h t−1 ∈ H t−1 inside each period, the following condition is satisfied:
(1) where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Now we can switch to the repeated game without beginning node. In this case history in period t is h t = © s
. We need to include in it all periods up to minus infinity, since there is no beginning node. Looking at the definition of h t , it is clear that the set of all possible histories is now the same for all periods: h t ∈ H, where H = (S × S)
∞ . The definition of a strategy and of an equilibrium are very similar to the previous ones:
Definition 3 A strategy for player i in the repeated game without initial node is an infinite set of functions, one for each t ∈ {. . . , −1, 0, 1, . . .} of the form s
Definition 4 A pair of strategies {s t 1 , s t 2 } ∞ t=−∞ constitute a SPE of the repeated game without initial node if, for all periods t ∈ {. . . , −1, 0, 1, . . .}, and for all histories h t−1 ∈ H inside each period, the following condition is satisfied:
(2) where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
We can see that having or not an initial node makes little difference in the complexity of the problem. We have in both cases an infinite countable set of conditions to be checked with an infinite countable set of functions that constitute the strategies. There are no problems with the utility functions if they are additively separable in time, so we can define utility for a given period conditionally as in equations (1) and (2) (see section 4 for details).
Stationary Strategies and Stable Equilibria:
Having defined an equilibrium in both cases (with and without initial period), the next step is to define stationary strategies. It is interesting to note that a strategy for the repeated game with initial period cannot satisfy the previous definition of stationarity 4 , because the functions s t i are defined over different sets (H t ) for different periods. Even if the strategy depends only on the previous period, it is not possible to represent the strategy in period 0 as in the other periods, because the history in period 0 is the null set(see note 4). However, when there is no initial node, all functions s t i are defined over the same set (H), so it is possible to have stationary strategies. Here we have one advantage of our approach: it is possible to study stationary strategies, and this fact can simplify the analysis a lot, instead of making it more difficult. Note that with stationary strategies, we do not need to check deviations in all periods in all histories. Instead, it is enough to fix one period t, and analyze deviations in all histories h t−1 , but only for this period, because the only difference between two subgames is the previous history, not the period itself.
Let
be the equilibrium path of strategies s 1 and s 2 given the history h t . Now we are prepared to present the definition of a dynamically stable SPE:
Definition 6 A subgame perfect equilibrium for a repeated game with no initial node is (dynamically) stable if: A) The strategies that constitute the equilibrium are stationary and B) ∀h t , the following limit exists, and it is independent of h t :ŝ
Let's callŝ * the long run outcome, and u(ŝ * 1 ,ŝ * 2 ), u(ŝ * 2 ,ŝ * 1 ) the long run payoffs for player 1 and 2, respectively.
Since repeated games with initial period cannot satisfy the previous definition, the next section focuses only on repeated games without initial node.
3 Outcomes supportable as a stable subgame perfect equilibrium:
It is presented in this section the main result of the paper: payoffs that are individually rational to both players can be supported as a stable SPE. We start by defining the minmax value for player 1, v =min
for simplicity, we are focusing on symmetric games, this is also the minmax value for player 2. Let s m = {s m1 , s m2 } be one strategy profile in which this minmax value is attained. Again, by symmetry, minmax for player 2 is attained at {s m2 , s m1 }. Now assume the following:
Take s p1 as in the previous proposition, and take s p2 = s m2 . Normalize u (s p1 , s p2 ) = 0. Then it should be clear that v ≥ 0. Furthermore, under assumption A2, s p2 is the (static) best response to s p1 , so u (s p2 , s p1 ) ≥ v ≥ 0. Assumption A3: s p1 6 = s a and s p2 6 = s a .
Again, this assumption is to simplify the analysis. The strategy presented in the following subsection is based on this assumption. A slightly modified version of the strategy is needed if A3 doesn't hold (see note 8).
The three following subsections are as follows. The first presents the type of strategies that will be used in the proof of the 'folk' result, presented in the second subsection. Finally, we study how long can be the punishment interval T that follows a deviation for a given value of δ.
Strategies with T Punishment Periods:
The strategy to be developed here try to support certain outcome {s c1 , s c2 }, by imposing a penalty of T periods for the deviating player. For simplicity it is assumed that this outcome is such that s c1 = s c2 = s c .
The intuition of the strategy is very simple. In fact, the strategy can be defined very easily in the case with initial period, as follows. Start in the cooperative phase, with two players playing s c . If player 1 deviates, switch to phase 1, and if player 2 deviates, switch to phase 2. In phase 1, the prescribed profile is {s p1 , s p2 }. The game remains in this phase until {s p1 , s p2 } is observed T consecutive periods, in which case game switch again to the cooperative phase. The same for phase 2, except that the prescribed profile is {s p2 , s p1 }.
However, the problem arises when there is no initial node. In this case, we cannot say things like "game starts in phase..." because the game does not start. The alternative is to define the phase as a function of the previous history. Also, we need strategies to be independent of calendar time, by stationarity.
I will try to present the strategy in a formal way. This is a little bit complicated, so keep in mind the example with initial node, because the intuition is the same.
The strategy for player 1 with T periods of punishment is as follows 6 :
Step 1: Analyze previous history h −1 . If there is at least one period with the profile {s c , s c }, then take τ = max {t : {s If none of the above is satisfied, then initialize θ 0 = 0 and go to step 3.
Step 2 
= s p1 and s τ +1 1 6 = s p2 in which case i = 1. Iterate until θ 0 is computed.
Step 3: If θ 0 = 0, then play s c . If θ 0 = 1, then play s p1 . If θ 0 = 2, then play s p2 .
The blind variable θ (blind in the sense that it is only used to determine the action to be played, with no other future effects) can be interpreted as the phase in which the game is. However, the strategy is presented in this way to avoid confusion between imposing a particular phase in a particular period, and determining the phase in one period endogenously. This is done in step 1. In step 2 we analyze deviations from cooperation, or from a punishment phase, that have been occurred in the past, to be sure that at each time we know who is the player that has deviated most recently. In step 3 we simply say the players to play according to the current phase, which has been determined in the two previous steps. It is worth noting that we need to do the three steps at each period. Formally, it is not possible to make them once and then follow the argument at the beginning of this subsection for games with initial period (because we require stationarity), although the intuition is similar.
Note that this strategy is not Markovian, unless we restrict the domain. Since it is defined for all histories, it may be the case that we have only one cooperation a lot of periods ago. Furthermore, we can have no cooperation at all. Hence, strategy can depend on a large number of past periods; we cannot set an upper bound on periods that step 1 needs to work.
Example: Consider the Cournot model presented in section 2.1. Clearly, minmax value for both players is v = 0, attained at {s m1 = 0, s m2 = 1}. Note that in this example A2 is not satisfied. However, as was argued, this assumption is not necessary for the result, and the example is a good illustration of what can be done in this case. The particular structure of the example allows us to define the punishment profile in a different way: s p1 = 0 and s p2 = 1 2
. In words, player 1 is punished by producing 0 and his opponent producing the monopolistic output. Then, it is clear that u (s p1 , s p2 ) = 0, and s p2 = arg max ª can be supported. Clearly, assumption A3 is satisfied.
The 'folk' result:
The result is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Suppose we have a stage game in normal form satisfying assumption A1, and consider the repeated game with no initial period. Then (A) ∃δ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all δ ∈ £δ , 1 ¢ , every pure strategy profile with payoffs greater than the minmax values is supportable as the limit of a stable SPE. Moreover, (B) for all δ ∈ £δ , 1 ¢ , convergence to this profile can be achieved in a finite number of periods, for all current histories.
Proof: Part (B) is done in detail in the following subsection. The proof of part (A) is done for simplicity under assumption (A2) 7 , and (A3) 8 . If the profile to be supported is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, then it is trivial to support it, with strategies independent of history and equal to the profile to be supported. If not, then take the strategies defined in the previous section, with a penalty length T arbitrarily chosen, and {s c , s c } 7 The result remains true even if this is not the case. The difference is that a new constraint of the form T > K must hold, where K is a finite constant determined by payoffs in certain profiles. But since K is finite, the result is not affected. The particular proof for this case is available from the author upon request.
8 If this assumption is not true, we need to modify slightly the strategy presented. In particular, we need to take τ = min {min {t : s t 1 = s c } , min {t : s t 2 = s c }} from the beginning of step 1. The rest remains unchanged (details are available upon request).
as the profile to be supported 9 . We need to show three things. First, the strategies are stationary. Second, they induce a convergent path, for all histories. And third, there are no profitable deviations.
The first part is straightforward, since strategies do not depend on calendar time.
The second part is easy too. Note that at the current period we have a phase endogenously determined, for all histories. If this phase is 0, then convergence is immediate. If it is 1 or 2, convergence is achieved at most in T periods, depending on the number of periods of the corresponding punishment (the fact that T needs to be finite under these strategies is developed in the next subsection). Therefore, condition B in the definition of a stable equilibrium is satisfied.
To prove the third part, note that an endogenous phase for current period is calculated in the strategy. Since then, the play evolves through phases imposing a T periods penalty to deviating players, no matter if they deviate in the cooperative phase, or in the punishment phases. Therefore, it is easy to see that the following conditions are enough to avoid profitable deviations:
Equation (3) is to avoid deviations in histories that the player is supposed to punish the other player for t periods. Equation (4) refers to histories in which the player is supposed to be punished for t periods. Finally, equation (5) avoid deviations when players are supposed to cooperate and play s c .
Let's focus on the first condition. It can be rearranged to obtain:
Now, under assumption A2,
¢ ≥ 0 for t ≤ T and δ ∈ (0, 1), and u (s c , s c ) > v ≥ 0, by the requirements of the theorem. Therefore, condition (6) is always satisfied. Now go to condition (4). It is clear that, since u (s c , s c ) > 0, we can focus on the extreme case when t = T . Rearrange to obtain:
Note that max
Hence, for a finite T there exists a δ 1 ∈ (0, 1) such that (7) is satisfied for all δ ∈ [δ 1 , 1). Finally, condition (5) can be expressed as:
Note that the left hand side of (8) is a polynomial (in δ) of degree T + 1. Let's call it P (δ), so equation (8) is equivalent to P (δ) ≤ 0. It's easy to see that P (0) =max ≥ 1: In this case the polynomial P (δ) is (strictly) decreasing in (0, 1). Since P (0) =max s u (s, s c ) − u (s c , s c ) > 0 and P (1) = 0, then P (δ) > 0 for δ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, there is no equilibrium in this case. Now, it may be interesting to compare this constraint (δ ≥ 0.5) with the one obtained in a standard trigger equilibrium with Nash reversion. NE payoffs are 1 9
for both players, so the constraint (assuming we start with full reputation) is:
As pointed out by Abreu (1988) , Nash reversion need not be the best punishment scheme, and the same can be said for the strategies presented here. Nevertheless, this comparison is useful to see that requiring dynamic stability doesn't imply too strong new constraints over δ.
Bounds for the punishment interval:
In this subsection we make a different type of analysis. Once we have shown that a stable perfect equilibrium exists for sufficiently patient players, we can ask ourselves the following: for a given (sufficiently high) δ, what values of T constitute a stable SPE?
We have showed that a necessary condition is < 1, so the first constraint on T is:
The other constraints on T are equations (7) and (8), but now for a fixed δ. With some algebra we can obtain the following from (7):
The numerator and the denominator are negative, and δ is big enough so that denominator is small enough (in absolute value) to produce a sensible bound.
From (8) we can obtain:
Therefore the admissible values for T are the positive integers such that (9), (10) and (11) are satisfied. The lower bound is
Note that numerator is finite because of assumption A1 and because max
The denominator is also finite and different from 0 for δ < 1. Therefore, the upper bound is strictly finite, so convergence is achievable in a finite number of periods.
The intuition of having an upper bound is very simple. It is a straightforward consequence of the fact that the player that is being punished is required to have incentives to follow the strategy. Clearly, deviation is more profitable if punishment period is bigger. We can see this by noting that the set
is strictly decreasing in T .
12
Example: Take for example δ = 0.75. Remember that in our example (9) is not binding. Constraints (10) and (11) are respectively T ≤ 2.4 and 11 Remember that condition (9) is a strict inequality, and the other two conditions are weak inequalities. 12 We say that a set A(T ) is (strictly) decreasing in
T ≥ 0.148. Hence, the admissible values for T (given δ = 0.75) are only 1 and 2. Therefore, convergence takes place in at most three periods (two for the punishment plus one for the first cooperative period).
Concluding Comments:
Here I want to make two concluding reflexions. One is about the concept itself of game with no beginning, and about existence of stable SPE. The other is one caveat about the extrapolation of the results presented here. Note that in the traditional repeated games with initial node we have a very well defined utility function for the whole game, and we usually assume that it is additively separable over time. On the other hand, the repeated game without initial node cannot have a well defined utility function for the whole game. This may seem to be a weakness of the approach, but it is not. Simply we define utility function conditional on being in one particular period. Here the analogy with the Solow model is useful again. In the Solow model with endogenous savings decisions we have an utility function conditional on being in the current period. We don't have an utility function for the whole time domain of the economy. It is the same in our model.
Having said this, it is possible to ask ourselves about existence of a stable SPE. We cannot rely on the traditional arguments of existence of NE in each subgame, because in contrast with the repeated game with initial node we cannot study the whole game. However, existence can be easily obtained, as long as there is at least one NE in pure strategies of the stage game, since the strategies 'play the static NE in each period, regardless of history' is always a stable SPE.
Another thing I want to say is about the limitations of the definitions and results presented here. Note that the theorem requires that the outcome to be supported is in pure strategies. Although the rest of the assumptions are innocuous, and are made for exposition ease, the requirement of pure strategies cannot be generalized in a straightforward manner. In the standard 'folk' theorem, it is assumed that feasible outcomes achievable as convex combinations of pure strategy outcomes can be supported using a public randomizing device and a correlated distribution over outcomes in each period, in such a way that expected payoff is precisely the one to be supported. However, we cannot do this here, because we require equilibrium path to be convergent, not to switch at random over a set of outcomes. Nevertheless, one can have a notion of dynamic stability in these cases. Perhaps the simplest way is to substitute condition B in the definition of a stable SPE by convergence in expected payoffs, not in the profile played itself. Maybe there are other possibilities, like convergence in distribution over outcomes, but it can be difficult to develop stationary strategies with the property that future probability distribution over outcomes is invariant, irrespective of the realization of the present (stochastic) outcome.
Finally, I want to make some concluding thoughts about possible extensions. As was mentioned above, it may be interesting to develop a weaker concept of dynamic stability robust to the use of mixed strategies. Also, a concept of stability for games with incomplete information may be useful. Probably, this definition will be near the equilibria proposed in Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Green and Porter (1984) . However, the extension is not straightforward. We can make the definition analogous to those used in stochastic processes: assume that from now on all stochastic variables take a realization equal to their mean value (this includes variables related to imperfect information). Then, the extension of definition 6 is immediate.
It is interesting to note that the result presented here is in a sense a limit result. We can only say that with our strategies we can support stable equilibria for a sufficiently high discount factor. I don't say here anything about optimal punishment schemes (satisfying stability), in the sense that it may exist other strategies that require weaker conditions forδ. This is obviously a possible extension.
